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Résumés 
English Francais 
§ 1 briefly reviews first the received interpretation of Bentham, which sees him as 
having had little to do with the development of economics (excepting some passing 
mentions which recognize his deployment of the concept of utility or his reduction of 
human motivation to self-interest, and perhaps a note on his discussion of the concept 
of diminishing marginal utility); and second, the manner in which he applies his 
concept of rationality to political economy. In § 2, the central thesis of the paper is 
presented: it is argued that an examination of his insights into the psychology of 
individual choice supplies good reasons to identify him as an intellectual godfather of 
behavioural economics. In keeping with the normativity of his concept of rationality, 
Bentham would maintain that the way in which traditional economics continues to 
ignore the gulf between its model of human decision-making and the facts of human 
psychology weakens its usefulness both as a science and as a guide to public policy. 
Bentham anticipated several modifications to the standard model (for instance loss-
aversion, the endowment effect, reference dependence, framing, the desire for 
cognitive ease, and status-quo bias) which have been introduced later by behavioural 
economics. § 3 introduces two problems concerning the normativity of economics, the 
first of which, at least for Bentham, rests upon a false premise, while his substantive 
notion of rationality insulates him against the second. 
 
 
Français  
§ 1 revoit en bref premièrement l’interprétation standard de Bentham, qui le voit 
comme ayant peu à faire avec le développement des sciences économiques (excepté 
des mentions passagères qui reconnaissent son élaboration du concept de l’utilité ou 
sa réduction de la motivation humaine à l’intérêt personnel, et peut-être une note sur 
sa discussion du concept de l'utilité marginale décroissante), et deuxièmement, la 
manière avec laquelle il applique son concept de la rationalité à l’économie politique. 
§ 2 présent la thèse centrale de cet article: Il est proposé qu’une examination des 
perspicacités de Bentham vis-à-vis la psychologie de choix individuel fournit des 
bonnes raisons pour l’identifier comme un parrain intellectuel de l’économie 
comportementale. Conforme à la normativité de son concept de la rationalité, 
Bentham affirmerait, que la manière avec laquelle l’économie traditionnelle continue 
à ignorer le fossé entre le modèle traditionnel du processus de la prise de décision 
humaine et les caractéristiques de la psychologie humaine, affaiblit son avantage non 
seulement comme science, mais aussi comme guide aux politiques publiques. 
Bentham avait anticipé quelques modifications au modèle standard (par exemple 
l’aversion à la perte, l’effet de dotation, la dépendance à la référence, le cadrage, le 
désir de l’aisance cognitive, et la tendance au statu quo) qui ont été introduits plus tard 
par l’économie comportementale. § 3 introduit deux problèmes concernant la 
normativité de l’économie, dont le premier, au moins pour Bentham, dépend d’une 
fausse hypothèse, alors que son idée fondamentale de la rationalité le défend contre le 
deuxième. 
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Introduction 
Jeremy Bentham is celebrated as the founder of classical utilitarianism, but his 
influence on the development of economic thought has often been considered 
negligible (Schumpeter 1954, 128–9).1 In general terms, Bentham’s deployment of 
the language of utilitarian calculation, his assumption of self-interested maximizing 
rationality, and his extensive discussion of diminishing marginal utility (Bentham 
1843, i. 304-7; iii. 228–30) has led to some recognition of his (indirect) influence, 
through the later agency of Jevons (1970 (1871)) and Edgeworth (1967 (1881)), on 
the development of economics as a science grounded in the psychology of man the 
utility maximizer. There has also been some discussion, derived from examination of 
Bentham’s unpublished manuscripts, of the way in which he prefigured the later 
deployment of both willingness to pay, and of indifference between pleasures—or 
combinations of pleasures and pains—as indicative of equality in value, which lie at 
the heart of contemporary cost-benefit analysis and micro-economics respectively. 
                                            
1 Although Bentham invested considerable time and effort writing on political economy, it was not 
until the 1940s that any attempt was made to produce a critical edition of his works in this area 
(Bentham 1952–4). It is perhaps unsurprising that the most popular fruit of Werner Stark’s herculean 
labours in producing this edition should prove to be the two texts therein contained which are farthest 
from being coherent works of Bentham. Scholars are understandably drawn to Stark’s editorial 
constructions, ‘The Philosophy of Economic Science’ and the ‘The Psychology of Economic Man’ 
(Bentham 1952–4, i. 79–119 and iii. 419–50), despite the fact that Bentham wrote no such works, 
because they offer the prospect of accessing the essence of Bentham’s thought on political economy 
without ploughing through the mass of words in which these nuggets are contained. In order to create 
‘The Psychology of Economic Man’ Stark drew on sixteen separate works, none of which were 
ostensibly concerned with political economy. 
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(UC n.d. xxvii. 36–7; Baumgardt 1952; Goldworth  1979; Guidi 2000; Warke 
2000a).2 
This paper will argue that an examination of Bentham’s insights into the 
psychology of individual choice provides good reasons to identify him as an 
intellectual Godfather of behavioural economics. Modern mainstream economics 
faces a problem in that, as demonstrated by Behavioural economics, its model of 
economic rationality does a very poor job of predicting human behaviours in a 
complex world. For Bentham, the ‘science’ of political economy was of no use unless 
it helped to inform the ‘art’ of legislation, and thus contributed to increases in well-
being. Bentham’s political economy was always a matter of praxis, of the application 
of the best available theory to the resolution of practical problems. Frugality in the 
multiplication of theoretical presuppositions was generally a good thing, but not if it 
issued consistently in inaccurate predictions. In seeking to guide legislative practice, 
Bentham developed what he termed ‘axioms of mental pathology’, effectively 
generalizations about human cognitive functioning, which, as noted in § 2, feature 
anticipations of central conclusions of behavioural economics. 
1. Bentham, rationality and economics 
1.1 Rationality: formal or substantive 
In modern economics, the rationality of economic choices is simply assumed. No 
attempt is made to measure utility, the presumed end of action, directly. Instead, the 
rationality of choice is inferred via the assumption of complete and transitive 
preference orderings between goods, derived from their predicted utility: ‘the 
proposition that people maximize utility was granted the status of a maintained 
hypothesis, which is used to constrain the interpretation of other facts but is not itself 
                                            
2 For fuller discussions of Bentham’s attempts to address the difficulties involved in measuring the 
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subject to test.’ (Kahneman, Wakker & Sarin 1997, 397) Bentham would have been 
content with this hypothesis, subject to two significant qualifications. First, he would 
insist that utility be understood in terms of the desire to attain pleasure or avoid pain: 
‘my notion of man is, that, successfully or unsuccessfully, he aims at happiness ... in 
every thing he does.’3 (Bentham 1977, 67) Second, as the quotation makes clear, he 
would recognize that the achievement of this universal goal could not be 
unproblematically assumed: we often make mistakes. 
 The evolution of the concept of utility in the history of economic theory has 
been charted, and the reasons for the displacement of happiness as the substantive 
goal of rational action insightfully analayzed, by skilful commentators (Bruni & 
Sugden 2007; Sent 2004; Read 2007; Warke 2000a), and will not be addressed in 
detail here. As Bruni and Sugden have argued, part of Pareto’s endeavour was 
precisely to disassociate economics from psychology, and to ground it entirely on 
‘principles of abstract rational choice’ (2007, 171), while the core characteristic of 
rationality is consistency: ‘In modern versions of the theory of choice, axioms of 
consistency of preferences are usually justified as formal principles of rationality.’ 
(Bruni & Sugden 2007, 170) Bentham’s model of rationality differs radically from the 
minimalist formal version offered by contemporary theory, in which the relation 
between rationality and consistency comes close to identity: ‘Rationality is logical 
coherence—reasonable or not’4 (Kahneman 2011, 411; see also Read 2007, 46; 
Morewedge in press). Bentham would agree that rational choice was characterized by 
logical coherence, so that rational choices are consistent and transitive (where 
consistent means instrumentally connected to the same end: happiness); but he would 
                                                                                                                             
value of pleasures and pains see Warke 2000b, Guidi 2007, Quinn 2014a. 
3 This is the first extract deployed by Stark in ‘The Psychology of Economic Man’ (Bentham 1952–4, 
iii. 421). 
4 For rationality as consistency plus maximization, see Becker 1996, 23.  
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not insist that preferences are simply given, and remain constant even while 
constraints change. Bentham certainly recognized that human individuals often make 
mistakes in their attempts at rational choosing: ‘such is human nature: any thing rather 
than consistency’ (UC n.d. lxii.188), but might also note that our failure to be 
consistently rational does not destroy the value of rationality as a standard of 
evaluation, or as a goal. 
For Bentham, consistency was a necessary condition for rationality, but 
certainly was not a sufficient one, since rationality had an essential normative 
component. In contrasting his own approach to political economy with that of Adam 
Smith, Bentham argued (somewhat inaccurately)5 that Smith had written principally 
of the science, the το ον, or ‘what is’, whereas his own concern was primarily with the 
art, the το πρεπον, or ‘what ought to be’ (UC n.d. xvii. 14 (1952–4, i. 224)). Art and 
science for Bentham were two complementary descriptions of a single body of 
knowledge (UC n.d. lxix. 197). In keeping with his utilitarian perspective, the 
normative branch of the enquiry was the more important of the two (UC n.d. ci. 153 
(1838–43, viii. 233)). What any would-be legislator might reasonably demand from 
Bentham’s art of legislation is an objective criterion for the evaluation of law and 
policy, to serve as a key to ‘the art of knowing what ought to [be] done in the way of 
internal government’ (UC n.d. lxix. 195). 
1.2 Rationality and self-interest 
Bentham’s is both a calculating rationality, and a maximizing one. For him, value – 
all value – depends on a single binary opposition between agreeable sensations (i.e. 
pleasures) on the one hand, and disagreeable ones (i.e. pains) on the other. Bentham 
takes the preference for pleasure over pain as the foundational premise of rationality. 
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By inference therefrom, a pleasure of greater value is preferable to one of lesser value: 
‘Things are good or bad by comparison: good itself is bad, in comparison of better’. 
(UC n.d. clxvi. 201) The assessment of quantities, calculation in a word, is for 
Bentham utterly integral to the meaning of rationality. The goal of the prudentially 
rational human agent is to maximize her net balance of pleasure over pain. Insofar as 
homo oecomomicus is assumed to be a self-interested utility maximizer, Bentham 
would recognize his own characterization of typical human motivation.6 Bentham 
asserted a connection between the pursuit of self-interest and the survival of the 
species (1983, 108), but did not assume that all motivation was egoistic. He 
recognized that sympathy for others, understood as desire for their well-being, could 
provide a motive for action, insisting only that since the pleasure I derived from 
knowledge of their well-being is mine, the desire to promote that well-being is 
motivated by the prospect of a pleasure which was likewise mine (Bentham 1983, 36). 
The range over which sympathy extended was variable, while the wider it extended, 
the closer would its dictates come to those of abstract utility. The task of the legislator 
was to harmonise the universal motive with the only acceptable moral end: ‘Self-
regard actually and properly the universally predominant motive’; ‘According to 
utility, proper end: greatest happiness of greatest number. Actual end: each man’s 
own’ (Bentham 1983, 35, 37). The core task of the utilitarian legislator is to alter self-
interested individual calculations of consequences to unite the two, by bringing 
interest into line with duty (Bentham 2010a, 353). 
In relation to political economy, since wealth was an all-purpose ticket to the 
instruments of happiness, Bentham endorses the assumption that individuals in 
                                                                                                                             
5 For the view that Smith’s political economy formed a consistent whole with his moral and legal 
philosophy see Haakonssen 1981, and Winch 1983, 1992, 1996. 
6 Of the thirty-four extracts contained in Stark’s compilation ‘The Psychology of Economic Man’, 
almost half contain the assertion of the prevalence of self-interest as a motive. 
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general desire to maximize their wealth (and thereby their happiness): ‘To get money 
is what most men have a mind to do: because he who has money gets, as far as it goes, 
most other things that he has a mind for.’7 (1787, 97 (1952–4, i. 157)) As already 
noted, the standard model takes the rationality of individual preferences as given, 
which is to say that individuals are always correct about what is best for them (about 
how, that is, to maximize their utility) (Thaler & Sunstein 2009, 10; Altman 2012, 92). 
For his part, Bentham follows Smith in endorsing this approach, at least to the extent 
of arguing at length that individuals are much more likely to be correct than 
government. In analysis of the best means to maximize national wealth, Bentham 
bases his conclusions on the relative position of individuals and governments in 
relation to the necessary conditions for voluntary human action, namely interest (I 
must want to do it), knowledge (I must know how to do it), and power (I must have 
the capacity to do it). With regard to interest, the conclusion is quickly reached (UC 
n.d. xvii. 211 (Bentham 1952–4, iii. 333)). By contrast, there may be cases where 
government is best placed to provide power, legal or financial, but the derivation of 
the latter from the pain-inducing source of coercive taxation places strict limits on the 
eligibility of this resource. There certainly are cases where government is in a position 
to promote the acquisition and diffusion of technical knowledge and empirical data 
(UC n.d. xvii. 244–6 (Bentham 1952–4, iii. 336–8)), and this exception will be further 
addressed below. However, the conclusion of Bentham’s analysis is that, if the goal of 
political economy is to maximize wealth, government is best advised to leave the vast 
bulk of the decision-making up to individuals (UC n.d. xvii. 218 (1952–4, iii. 337)). 
                                            
7 See also UC n.d. xvii. 309 (Bentham 1952–4, iii. 323–4): ‘To add to his own particular stock … is, 
with a very few exceptions, the constant aim and occupation of every individual, in every civilized 
nation.’ Of course, wealth did not constitute happiness, and the presumed desire to maximize wealth 
could be overridden by the value of other sources of enjoyment. As Bentham continued: ‘Leave men to 
themselves, each man is occupied either in the acquisition of wealth (the instrument of enjoyment) or in 
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§ 2 Bentham the behavioural economist? 
Behavioural economics presents a challenge to the conventional model of economic 
man through the sheer bulk of the evidence it presents of the way in which human 
cognitive processes often bear little resemblance to the hypothetical reasonings of 
economic man: ‘the aim is to model economic agents in ways that take account of the 
affective responses that decision problems evoke in human beings and of the 
cognitive processes that are used in human decision-making’ (Bruni & Sugden 2007, 
161). Economic theory ignores psychology at its peril. Camerer and Lowenstein 
remark in passing that many early economists ‘moonlighted as the psychologists of 
their times’ (2004, 5), but Bentham went further than most in explicitly recognizing 
the relations between psychology and political economy, and indeed between 
psychology and all human sciences. His own psychology was largely drawn from 
Helvetius, Beccaria and Hume, and was based on the associationist approach 
developed systematically by Hartley (1775). Bentham founded his prescriptions on 
psychological assumptions which he termed ‘axioms of mental pathology’. Mental 
pathology consisted in ‘the knowledge of the feelings, affections, and passions, and 
their effects upon happiness’ (Bentham 1843, i. 304), while its axioms were defined 
thus:  
Axioms of mental pathology may be styled those most commonly applicable 
propositions by which statement is made of the several occurrences by which 
pleasure or pain is made to have place in the human mind:—as also the results 
observed to follow from the performance of such operations as have been 
                                                                                                                             
some actual enjoyment, which, in the eyes of the only competent judge, is of more value.’ (UC n.d. xvii. 
242 (Bentham 1952–4, iii. 323–4)) 
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performed … for the purpose of effecting the augmentation of the aggregate of 
the pleasures, or the diminution of the aggregate of the pains (1843, i. 305) 
Bentham’s axioms bear close examination, not least because they reveal his 
anticipation of several assumptions incompatible with the standard model of 
economic rationality. 
2.1 Loss Aversion, Status quo bias and Herd-following 
Kahneman describes the phenomenon of loss-aversion as ‘certainly the most 
significant contribution of psychology to behavioural economics’ (2011, 300), while  
Camerer and Lowenstein recruit Adam Smith to the ranks of proto-behavioural 
economists on the basis of his recognition of loss-aversion as a widespread 
psychological characteristic (2004, 5).8 For his part, Bentham not only included in his 
axioms of mental pathology an explicit statement of loss-aversion, but utilized the 
concept as the very bedrock of his discussion of distributive justice in particular, and 
of the art of legislation in general. Loss aversion is the psychological root of the 
primacy which Bentham accords to the subordinate end of security. ‘Mankind in 
general appear to be more sensible of grief than pleasure from an equal cause. For 
example a loss which would diminish the fortune of an individual by one quarter, 
would take more from his happiness than would probably be added by a gain which 
should double it.’9 (Bentham 1843, i. 307) Bentham traces the reasons for this 
psychological asymmetry to what behavioural economists call the endowment effect: 
‘A loss is almost always unexpected, because a man naturally hopes to keep what he 
possesses. This expectation is founded upon the ordinary course of things; for if we 
                                            
8 Loss-aversion as a generic psychological propensity should be distinguished from individual attitudes 
(and particularly aversive attitudes) toward risk, variations in which are successfully incorporated into 
the standard model of economics. 
9 Curiously enough, Bentham’s rough estimate of the psychological rate of exchange between losses 
and gains turns out to be broadly vindicated by empirical findings: broadly speaking, people typically 
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look at the whole mass of men, they not only keep what they have acquired, but still 
further increase its amount.’ (1843, i. 306) And again, in arguing that, in legal cases 
between parties equally wealthy, happiness is more likely to be maximized by a 
distribution which favours the defendant against the plaintiff: 
 The loser experiences the pain of disappointed expectation: the other is simply 
 in the condition of not having gained. But the negative evil of not having 
 gained, is not equal to the positive evil of having lost. (If this were not the case, 
 everyman would experience this evil with regard to every thing which he did 
 not obtain, and the causes of evil being infinite, every one ought to find 
 himself infinitely miserable). (1843, i. 307) 
Bentham’s explanation of loss aversion thus depends on the special features of the 
pain of disappointment, which itself depends upon the centrality of expectation in his 
psychology (Kelly 1990; Guidi 2007).  
 This disposition to look forward, which has so marked an influence upon the 
 condition of man, may be called expectation—expectation of the future. It is 
 by means of this we are enabled to form a general plan of conduct; it is by 
 means of this, that the successive moments which compose the duration of 
 life … become parts of a continuous whole. (1843, i. 308) 
The pleasures of expectation are experienced utilities which arise from beliefs about 
future events. Expectation is the conviction that a future event will come to pass. 
Bentham recognizes that such beliefs are inescapably reference dependent, which 
means that my affective attitudes, and thereby my preferences, are influenced by my 
previous history and my current endowments. Since I very quickly become habituated 
to possession, or endowment, ‘[e]very thing which I actually possess, or which I 
                                                                                                                             
reject losses not compensated by the prospect of gains of twice the size (Kahneman & Shane 1990; 
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ought to possess, I consider in my imagination as about to belong to me for ever: I 
make it the foundation of my expectation’ (1843, i. 310). This expectation is not only 
reinforced, but indeed created, solely by the force of law which penalizes theft. 
Expectation derived from possession is the explanation of our experience that ‘the evil 
of loss is greater than the profit of gain’ (UC n.d. xcix. 53), while loss contrary to 
expectation causes a specific pain of disappointment, which Bentham defines simply 
as ‘expectation thwarted’ (1795, 28 (1952–4, i. 290)). 
 According to standard models of economic rationality, loss aversion is 
irrational, whilst recognition of the prevalence of loss aversion allows behavioural 
economics to make more accurate predictions of behaviour than those models 
(Camerer & Lowenstein 2004, 4–5; Kahneman 2011, 283–3). Behavioural economists 
disagree on whether loss aversion is a cognitive error, which might be corrected with 
better education and reflection, or is a perfectly rational reaction to perceived threats 
to well-being (Rabin 1998, 34–5). For his part, Bentham does not question the 
rationality of the phenomenon, but simply accepts its reality to the extent of building 
it into the legislator’s basic tool-kit of psychological presumptions. Late in life 
Bentham built this axiom into the ‘Disappointment Prevention Principle’ (Bentham 
2011, 242 (1843, iii. 212)), but forty years earlier he had stated it under a different 
name: ‘The principle of security … directs that events, inasmuch as they are 
dependent upon the laws, should be conformed to the expectations to which the laws 
have given birth.’ (1843, i. 308) 
 As noted above, Bentham explicitly recognized the phenomenon of 
diminishing marginal utility, and, in large part on the basis of its application to wealth, 
                                                                                                                             
Kahneman 2011, 284; Camerer & Lowenstein 2004, 15–16). 
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added equality to list set of subordinate ends of legislation, in addition to security, 
subsistence and abundance: 
 Thus it is, that if the effects of the first order were alone taken into account, 
 the consequence would be, that, on the supposition of a new constitution 
 coming to be established, with the greatest happiness of the greatest number 
 for its end in view, sufficient reason would have place for taking the matter of 
 wealth from the richest and transferring it to the less rich, till the fortunes of 
 all were reduced to an equality, or a system of inequality so little different 
 from perfect equality that the difference would not be worth calculating. (2011, 
 278 (1843, iii. 230)) 
Coercive redistribution in pursuit of equality is, however, ruled out by its pernicious 
effects in undermining security (and thereby abundance and subsistence). Indeed, with 
regard to the losers from retrenchments in public expenditure, Bentham’s position was 
that they should be indemnified: ‘no reform ought to be carried into effect without 
granting complete indemnity to those whose emoluments are diminished, or whose 
offices are suppressed’ (Bentham 1825, 298 (1843, ii. 251)). Bentham thus anticipates 
later developments in welfare economics and cost-benefit analysis, but goes further 
than the received view, by insisting that to qualify as unequivocally beneficial, 
government policies should ensure not only that winners could fully compensate 
losers, as in the Kaldor-Hicks criterion (Bhagwati 1994; Scitovsky 1941), but that 
they should so do. The tenacity with which such losers will seek to defend their 
current endowments is anticipated by Bentham, and he recommends compensation as 
the route to overcoming it (Bentham 1825, 301 (1843, iii. 252)). The impact of loss 
aversion on Bentham’s understanding of utilitarian justice, and on his strategies for 
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utilitarian reform, is pervasive and significant (Kelly 1990), and he would agree with 
Kahneman’s that ‘Loss aversion is a powerful conservative force’ (2011, 305).    
A further departure from economic rationality detailed by behavioural 
economists is status quo bias, which is closely connected with loss aversion and the 
endowment effect. The recognition of the ubiquity of loss aversion goes a long way to 
explaining the conservatism of some of Bentham’s policy recommendations. Because 
of the centrality of expectations to the experience of pleasures and pains, and because 
the expression ‘status quo’ includes the entire constellation of existing expectations, 
practically every change in law and policy will involve the enhancement of some 
expectations and the diminution of others. The asymmetry between gain and loss 
makes it much more difficult than it might appear at first blush for the welfare gains 
from any proposed change to outweigh the welfare losses, and often the safest policy 
is to leave things as they are. Hence Bentham’s advice to the legislator confronted 
with an established system of property rights: ‘He ought to maintain the distribution 
which is actually established’. (1843, i. 311) It should be noted that there is an 
obvious tension in Bentham’s thought between the conservative commitment to 
respecting established expectations, and the utilitarian commitment to reform of those 
expectations to deliver new benefits. The legislator has utilitarian reasons for 
respecting existing entitlements, but, insofar as she remains a utilitarian, she also has 
reasons for violating those entitlements, at least where they do not match the 
entitlements which would best serve to maximize utility. The policy implications of 
loss aversion and of diminishing marginal utility stand in direct opposition, while 
Bentham resolves the contradiction decisively in favour of the former.  
 Neither behavioural economics nor Bentham, however, advances loss aversion 
as a complete explanation of a general human preference for the devil you know. Both 
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identify two further related closely related cognitive biases, namely the preference for 
cognitive ease—itself the consequence of the rebarbative, because pain inducing, 
nature of cognitive effort—and the unreflective nature of habit—the tendency to 
process information, that is to think, and therefore to act, automatically or by 
default—that is, literally, in the absence of thought. Kahneman notes the influence on 
human cognitive processes of the desire not to work too hard (2011, 59–70). For 
Bentham, the love of ease, prompted by aversion to painful labour, was one of the 
‘most powerful, most constant, and most extensive’ of motives (1970, 155),10 which 
gave rise to what he called ‘the interest of the pillow’ (Bentham 1983, 85). Evidence 
of Bentham’s recognition of the influence of ‘the vis inertiae of the mind’ (UC n.d. 
lxxxvii. 175; 1827, ii. 218 (1843, vi. 446)), governed in part by our unreflective 
reliance on faulty, because lazy, reasoning, is widespread. To mention a single 
example, most of the argumentative work in the customary condemnation of lending 
money at high rates of interest was done simply by the attachment of the pejorative 
label ‘usury’ to the activity (Bentham 1787, 7 (1952–4, 130)). The infection of policy 
debates by the question-begging employment of dyslogistic appellatives was a 
phenomenon which Bentham saw everywhere, and which he viewed as a mischievous 
manifestation of the desire for cognitive ease, since it allowed the short-circuiting of 
proper investigation of facts. Unreflective endorsement of the status quo was an 
appeal not to evidence but to prejudice, that is precisely unevidenced assertion.11 To 
defend a law, an institution, or a practice purely by an appeal to the authority of 
custom and habit was to abandon rationality completely (Bentham 1843, i. 241). Do 
                                            
10 The equally universal motives were ‘physical desire, the love of wealth … the love of life, and the 
fear of pain’. 
11 See Bentham 2015, 41: ‘Prejudice … is a judgment, which being pronounced before evidence, is 
therefore pronounced without evidence.’   
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we tend uncritically to accept existing opinions when the public interest, and even our 
own private interests, are at stake? 
 Let Reason (that is utility) be fruitful and Custom barren is one of the 
 fundamental aphorisms of the greatest genius that ever trod the earth.12 
 Unhappily custom, that blind guide, is the only one habitually consulted, the 
 only one to whose suggestions men in general are disposed so much as to 
 listen with complacency. Man is a rational animal, say the logicians—true of 
 one out of fifty thousand: man is an imitative animal—true of every body. 
 (Bentham 2010a, 97–8n. My emphasis) 
Unreflective habit thus garners further support from another human predilection well-
established by experimental data, namely our ʻimitativeʼ nature, our desire to follow 
the herd. The fundamental desire for the approval of our fellows provided a 
foundational premise of Adam Smithʼs moral theory (Smith 1976 (1759), 116), and 
Bentham too recognized it, insisting only that it was ultimately self-regarding: the 
benefits of fitting-in were not exclusively psychological, but consisted in the readiness 
of others to provide a flow of ʻgood officesʼ, that is physical services. Popular opinion, 
and especially the opinion of that subset of the public with whom we interact on a 
daily basis (Bentham 2010a, 337n), wields the moral sanction, and punishes us for 
actions and attitudes which it disapproves: ʻA single individual is seldom able to 
withstand or change the laws established by public opinionʼ (Bentham 1825, ii. 225 
(1843, ii. 259)). 
 We have come a long way from the rational utility maximizer embodied in the 
standard model of economic reasoning, and from the economic model of rationality 
which, it has been argued, underpinned Bentham’s entire evaluative project. 
                                            
12 i.e. Sir Francis Bacon. 
16 
 
‘Happiness depends upon the correctness of the facts with which our mind is 
furnished, and the rectitude of our judgment’. (Bentham 1825, 69 (Bowring, ii. 213)) 
If our minds are furnished with spurious facts, and if our inferences from genuine 
facts are faulty, we will pay a cost in happiness forfeited. Does the legislator have a 
responsibility to furnish genuine facts, and to correct our judgments? Bentham 
sometimes sounded as if simply highlighting the divergence between popular opinion 
and the dictates of utility would suffice to eliminate it (1843, i. 324). However, in 
relation to a range of issues relevant to this paper—saving for the future for 
instance—he recognized a range of formidable obstacles to this happy outcome. His 
general answer to the question is, of course, that the propriety of government 
intervention depends on the outcome of a probabilistic calculation of the comparative 
costs and benefits of intervention.13 What is however clear, is that Bentham 
anticipated the insights of behavioural economics in relation not only to loss aversion, 
but to status quo bias, the desire for cognitive ease, and the prevalence of herd-
following. 
2.2 Wealth, Happiness, and the Easterlin Paradox 
Easterlin’s paradox arises from the failure of large increases in national wealth to 
translate into roughly equivalent increases in national happiness, as recorded in 
responses to scientific surveys of opinion (Easterlin 1995; 2001). Although Bentham 
endorsed the notion that the end of political economy was the maximization of wealth, 
he noted also that ‘Happiness—enjoyment—not money, is or ought to be the ultimate 
object of the legislator’s care’ (UC n.d. xvii. 31). Whilst money was a general means 
to acquire the instruments of happiness, and whilst it was true that ‘of two persons 
having unequal fortunes, he who bas most wealth must by a legislator be regarded as 
                                            
13 For a related discussion of Bentham’s approach to dealing with oppositions between prejudiced 
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having most happiness’ (Bentham 2011, 275 (1843, iii. 229)), it was no less true that 
the quantity of happiness would not increase in step with the quantity of wealth: ‘It 
will even be matter of doubt, whether ten thousand times the wealth will in general 
bring with it twice the happiness. (Bentham 2011, 275 (1843, iii. 229)) 
Not only does wealth suffer from diminishing marginal utility, but once 
subsistence (the basic need for food, clothing and shelter) is secured, the battle for 
happiness is more than half won. Bentham advances two assertions in support of this 
proposition. First, the most productive sources of pleasure—crudely the pleasures of 
eating and drinking, of sex and of rest, and the vicarious pleasure of knowing that 
those we care for are enjoying the first three—are at the command of everyone whose 
subsistence is secure:  
The principal enjoyments of which human nature is susceptible, constancy of 
repetition being considered as well as magnitude, are—those produced by the 
operations by which the individual is preserved; those produced by the 
operations by which the species is preserved; that cessation from labour which 
is termed repose; and that pleasure of sympathy which is produced by the 
observation of others partaking in the same enjoyments. (Bentham 1843, ix. 15) 
Second, Bentham speculates that human nervous systems become less sensitive to 
sensory inputs as a result of habitual experience of them:  
 [T]he quantity of felicity actually enjoyed depends on the degree of sensibility 
 to enjoyment, in each instance: and while in the labourer the sensibility is a 
 maximum, the degree of sensibility in the monarch may be a minimum . . . for 
                                                                                                                             
popular opinion and the dictates of utility see Quinn 2014b. 
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 by high doses of the exciting matter applied to the organ, its sensibility is in a 
 manner worn out. (Bentham 1843, ix. 15)14 
Further, in opposition to the standard model, Bentham once more recognizes the 
importance of context, and in particular of the reference points we use in evaluating 
our own situation. ‘Desires extend themselves with the means of gratification; the 
horizon is enlarged in proportion as we advance; and each new want … becomes a 
new principle of action.’ (Bentham 1843, i. 304) Current endowments very quickly 
become taken for granted, they cease to deliver any anticipatory pleasures, and open 
up whole new fields for the pains of apprehension and of loss.15 The systematic 
distortion of recalled past pleasures and pains and anticipated future ones follows 
from the comparative vividness of present experience (Pellegrino ([2014]). 
 The combined impact of endowment effects and loss aversion explains the 
importance of relative comparisons to individual happiness. In his poor law writings, 
Bentham distinguishes between absolute and relative indigence. The relation in 
question is not between an individual’s holdings and those of others, but between a 
single individual’s holdings at different periods: ‘Indigence … may be distinguished 
into absolute and relative: absolute, a deficiency in respect of the necessary means of 
preserving existence; relative, a deficiency of those means of comfort as well as 
subsistence to the enjoyment of which a man has been habituated.’ (Bentham 2010a, 
255n) Bentham is further explicit that the crucial variable is the trajectory on which 
we find our wealth and income: 
 Absolute necessaries being provided for, comparative happiness as between 
 man and man depends, even as far as wealth is concerned, not on the absolute 
 quantum of wealth through the period of life, but on the ratio of the quantum 
                                            
14 For the development of a similar argument in nineteenth-century psychology (and psychological 
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 of wealth at a more advanced period, compared with the quantum possessed 
 at a more early period: that is, upon the mass of affluence being in a state of 
 encrease, or at least not on the decline, in contradistinction to its being in a 
 declining state. (Bentham 2010a, 311–12. My emphasis) 
Bentham’s insight has been confirmed by numerous studies on the relationship 
between wealth and happiness (Frey & Stutzer 2002, 409–16; Lowenstein & 
Sicherman 1991; Lowenstein & Prelec 1993; Frank & Hutchens 1993), while the 
preference for increasing income profiles ‘appears to be driven in part by savouring 
and dread’—or, in Bentham’s lexicon, the pleasure of expectation and the pain of 
apprehension—‘and in part by adaptation and loss aversion’ (Camerer & Lowenstein 
2004, 26). Given the central importance of expectations which have become habitual, 
given the dependence of experienced pleasure or pain on changes or departures, either 
positive (pleasurable) or negative (painful), from the reference point of current 
endowment, Bentham’s conclusion regarding the comparative happiness of the rich 
man who has just experienced significant loss, and the poor man who has just 
experienced a significant enhancement in income, should come as no surprise: 
Habit tyrannizes the peasant not less than the prince. What a man has been 
used to have, he must continue to have, or he is unhappy. Be a man’s income 
at a given period what it may …, every accession it receives excites in his 
bosom the sentiment of affluence: every defalcation it receives excites in like 
manner the sentiment of privation and penury. The Prince who has £20,000 a 
year fixed income … enjoys more happiness (be it admitted) than the Peasant 
who has £20 a year fixed income … . Be it so: but it is not the less 
unquestionable, that as far as depends on pecuniary circumstances, the Prince 
                                                                                                                             
economics) see Bruni & Sugden 2007, 150–4. 
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whose income has just undergone a reduction from £30,000 to £20,000 is less 
happy than the Peasant whose income has received an encrease from £20 a 
year to £30. (Bentham 2010a, 312) 
 A second relativity also impacts on our current assessment of our happiness, 
and this depends upon social rather than temporal comparison: ‘Not happy enough to 
provoke our envy: not unhappy enough to warrant our sympathy: such is the condition 
in which, if it depended on each man, his fellows would be found.  … We can still 
worse bear that another should be too happy, than that he should not be enough so.’ 
(Bentham 2010a, 260) The impact of the rewards of others on the utility we derive 
from our own is completely overlooked by the standard model, but is recognized by 
behavioural economics, and by Bentham. It is true that he viewed envy as an irrational 
reaction to the good fortune of others (UC n.d. iii. 270–1 (1952–4, iii. 297–8)), but 
irrational or not, given its prevalence, it is a reaction of which it behoves the legislator 
to take account. Indeed, this is one reason why Bentham echoes Smith and presages 
Ricardo in endorsing the pursuit of growth. In a stationary or shrinking economy, with 
a stable or rising population, individual advancement becomes a zero-sum game: 
For nations as for individuals, the happiest state is not that of having made 
one’s fortune, but that of making it: growing prosperity, that is happiness. 
Should the point be reached at which all employments are full, at which the 
earth has received all its developments, and industry has no more progress to 
make, what would then be the condition of human nature? A man could only 
make his fortune at the expense of another. … Wages, the patrimony of the 
poor, that is of the great mass of the community, after having fallen gradually, 
will fix themselves at the point where they can furnish a man with bare 
                                                                                                                             
15 For the recognition of the insatiability of wants see for instance, Frey and Stutzer 2002, 414–15. 
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subsistence, with the most basic essentials. The state of work will be a state of 
war: all against all, fighting like gladiators at Rome—to the death. (Dumont 
n.d. 51, fo. 272 (My translation)16 
  Partly because of these effects, Bentham would not have been surprised to 
learn that a doubling of national income has not been matched by a doubling of 
reported levels of happiness. Like the poor man’s son of Smith’s famous parable 
(1976 (1759), 181–6) we are all liable to be caught up on what Layard calls the 
hedonic treadmill (2011, 48–9). For Bentham, Easterlin’s paradox is thus not remotely 
paradoxical, but depends in large part on psychological adaptation to increased 
prosperity. 
2.3 Framing: Bentham the spin-doctor 
At the top of Bentham’s list of proposed reforms of government finance was a revival 
and extension of the law of escheat, by which vacant titles to property in land reverted to 
the state, whilst his enthusiasm for idea was derived precisely from its promise to offer 
‘Supply without Burthen’. The measure stipulated that on the death of property-holders 
not survived by children or other close relations, one half of their estate was to be 
‘appropriated to the use of the public’ (Bentham 1795, 3 (1952–4, i. 283)), with the other 
half being disposed according to the will of the deceased. The dead have no expectations, 
while those of surviving children would be unaffected, since the transfer of property to 
them would continue unaltered. Meanwhile, the expectations of living but more distant 
collateral relatives could be modified without causing pain or alarm, provided that 
                                            
16 MS orig: ‘Pour les nations comme pour les individus, l’état le plus heureux n’est pas d’avoir fait sa 
fortune, mais de la faire: une prospérité croissante, voilà le bonheur. Quand on seroit au point que tous 
les emplois seroient pleins, que la terre auroit reçu tous ses développements, que l’industrie n’auroit 
plus de progrès à faire, quelle seroit alors la condition de la nature humaine? un  homme ne pourroit 
faire sa fortune qu’aux dépends d’un autre. … Les gages, ce patrimoine des pauvres, c.à.d de la grande 
masse de la Communauté, après être tombés graduellement, se fixeront au point où ils peuvent fournir 
à un homme sa simple subsistance, son plus étroit nécessaire. Un état de travail sera un état de guerre: 
tous contre tous, combattant comme les gladiateurs à Rome—jusqu’à la mort.’ 
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sufficient notice were given of the change. The beauty of the proposal, for Bentham, 
lay in the manner in which it would avoid impacting upon existing expectations, but 
would rather prevent their formation. 
 For present purposes, the crucial passage occurs when Bentham compares his 
proposal to a tax on the inheritance of property. In so doing, he demonstrates an 
awareness of the influence of the frame of a proposal on the cognitive processing of 
the information which it contains: 
 Under a tax on successions, a man is led in the first place, to look upon the 
 whole in a general view as his own: he is then called upon to give up a part. 
 His share amounts to so much: this share he is to have; only out of it, he is to 
 pay so much per cent. His imagination thus begins with embracing the whole: 
 his expectation fastens upon the whole: then comes the law putting in for its 
 part, and forcing him to quit his hold. This he cannot do without pain: if he 
 could, no tax at all, not even a tax on property, would be a burthen: 
 (Bentham 1795, 32–3 (1952–4, i. 292)) 
A fifty per cent tax on successions, with exemptions for those inheriting from parents 
or near relations, would have exactly the same impact as Bentham’s proposal on the 
post mortem disposal of the assets of the childless: the information contained in the 
two enactments would be substantively identical. However, Bentham the choice-
architect recognizes that the public’s evaluation of the two proposals will be very 
different, and that the difference arises from the role of law in giving rise to different 
expectations in the two cases.  
 Try the experiment upon a hungry child: give him a small cake, telling him 
 after he has got it, or even before, that he is to give back part of it. Another 
 time give him a whole cake, equal to what was left to him of the other and no 
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 more, and let him enjoy it undiminished—will there be a doubt which cake 
 afforded him the purest pleasure? (Bentham 1795, 33n (1952–4, i. 292n)17 
Bentham was thus perfectly aware of, and happy to exploit, the importance of framing 
in eliciting preferences. In the classic Asian disease experiment, the only difference 
between the alternatives presented consists in the framing of their consequences in 
positive (lives saved) or negative (lives lost) terms (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). 
The conclusion that simply changing the frame can so decisively reverse the decisions 
made poses a major challenge to the notion of rational consistency. However, from a 
utilitarian perspective, since in this experiment the predicted consequences of the two 
alternatives are of equal value, there is no rational basis for preferring one to the other. 
What would alarm Bentham is the possibility that a better policy might easily lose out 
to a worse simply because of the frame in which they are presented.18 In general, he 
would agree with the behavioural economists that broad frames tend to lead to better, 
meaning more instrumentally rational, choices (Kahneman 2011, 371–4). However he 
would I think, cleave to the reality of pleasures and pains, and insist that observations 
about pain and pleasure were capable of bearing truth, and thus of offering the 
potential for frame-independent rational choice. Demonstration that the frame is 
decisive in identical examples is not equivalent to demonstrating that the ‘facts’ do 
not exist, and cannot make a decisive difference in non-identical examples. 
2.4 Nudging and Defaults 
                                            
17 Purity—the chance of being followed by further pleasures—was only one of seven dimensions of 
pleasure which together constituted its value (Bentham 1970, 38–41). Here, however, it seems that 
Bentham is asserting that the total value of the latter experience will be greater (i.e. will deliver a 
greater net balance of pleasure over pain) than that of the former, since it will not include any pain of 
deprivation. 
18 The recent controversy in the UK about the ‘spare-room subsidy’, otherwise known as the ‘bedroom 
tax’, provides an example of how divergent descriptions of the same measure can give rise to different 
affective attitudes, and thereby opposite responses. 
24 
 
In terms of policy prescriptions, perhaps the most noteworthy contribution of 
behavioural economics has been the nudge theory of Thaler and Sunstein, who have 
introduced the notion of ‘choice architecture’ into contemporary debate: ‘A choice 
architect has responsibility for organizing the context in which people make 
decisions.’ (Thaler & Sunstein 2009, 3) In terms of Bentham’s logic of the will,19 the 
choice architect’s ‘nudges’ are distinguished from commands or prohibitions: ‘a 
nudge … is any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a 
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their 
economic incentives’. (Thaler & Sunstein 2009, 6. My emphasis) Unsurprisingly, 
Bentham explicitly discusses neither choice architecture, nudges, nor default options. 
However, he did recognize the pervasive influence of the context of choice, and in 
particular the power, derived from our disinclination to think too hard, of the framers 
of a choice to increase the chances that a particular option will be chosen. In ‘Indirect 
Legislation’, with reference to the legislator’s exposition of accessory offences, he 
noted the danger of bringing ‘innocence into danger by hasty and inconclusive 
inferences’. His gloss presents an analysis of the effect of changing the default option 
from ‘opt-in’ to ‘opt-out’: 
The description of an accessory offence can indeed scarcely be sufficiently 
secure without involving in it a clause leaving it to the discretion of the judge 
to determine concerning the conclusiveness of the inference. In this case the 
creation of such an offence comes to nearly the same thing as to suggest the 
fact in question to the judge in the way of instruction, under the character of an 
evidentiary circumstance. There is only the difference that in the latter case 
                                            
19 Bentham’s logic of the will anticipates modern deontic logic, and analyses the varieties of imperation. 
For Bentham, the directive portion of any law describes an action, together with a prescription in 
relation to it which splits crudely into four: do it, don’t do it, you don’t have to do it, and you don’t 
have to refrain from doing it. (Bentham 2010b, 115–41) 
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the legislator puts it to the judge to make the inference, whereas in the former 
he makes the inference himself, reserving only a power in the judge to repel it 
if he should think proper … . Upon the latter plan the conclusion is most likely 
to take place: in the former it requires an effort to establish it: on the latter it 
requires an effort to overthrow it. That side of an alternative has caeteris 
paribus the best chance which has the vis inertia of the mind in its favour. 
Whichever scale the vis inertia of the mind is thrown into possesses a great 
advantage. (UC n.d. lxxxvii. 175. My emphasis)     
Default options exploit precisely the vis inertia of the mind, that is, human aversion to 
labour. Thaler and Sunstein eschew direct appeals to well-being as the criterion of 
evaluation, but their rationale for nudging people towards certain options looks rather 
Benthamic: good nudges produce better choices and thus render ‘choosers better off, 
as judged by themselves’ (Thaler & Sunstein 2009, 5). Significant normative 
problems lurk behind this seductive formula, which will be addressed in § 3. For his 
part, it is difficult to imagine that Bentham would have hesitated to endorse their 
approach, including (at least in many cases) their caveat that the subject should retain 
the ability to resist the nudge without incurring significant costs. 
 For all his general endorsement of laissez-faire in political economy, Bentham 
made a significant exception in regard to the provision of knowledge. In discussion of 
indirect legislation he noted that ‘Sovereigns have hitherto been but little in use to 
stand forth in the character of instructors. It is a milder, however, and surely not less 
honourable function to enlighten one part of mankind by their wisdom, as to make 
another part feel the burthen of their power.’ (UC n.d. lxxxvii. 167) He recommended 
that government should directly address asymmetries of knowledge which allowed 
people to exploit the vulnerabilities of others. Standards of weights and measures, 
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officially approved indicators of quality on products (such as modern CE marks), 
registers of births, deaths and marriages, registers of property titles, and publication of 
current prices would go a long way toward preventing fraud. In addition, the legislator 
might consider ‘furnishing the people with cautionary instructions putting them on 
their guard against several modes of defraudment and other species of delinquency’ 
(UC n.d. lxxxvii. 153). Bentham considered whether government’s recommendations 
on the best ways to validate legal instruments, such as transfers of title, should or 
should not be mandatory, and noted:  
Instructions given by government to the effect above suggested, even though 
each were left at liberty to adopt them or not as he thought, would not by any 
means be useless. In matters of this sort people are ready enough in general to 
follow the patterns that are set before them by authorities much inferior to that 
of the legislature. Were such advice then to be given, the probability is that in 
general it would be taken: especially if the compliance with it were to be 
enforced by some trifling penalty (UC n.d. lxxxvii.160. My emphasis) 
 Again, following a pattern set before me is what I do when I accept a default option.  
  As noted above, Bentham’s analysis of the subjective factors of production of 
voluntary human actions—namely knowledge, interest, and power—features 
prominently in his writings on political economy. Default options do address interests 
to a modest extent, and thus do address the will (by providing a very modest 
disincentive to rejecting the default: I have to tick the box on the form), but their 
central operation concerns knowledge, and addresses the understanding. Defaults 
contain two different kinds of information. The first kind is simply the message that 
the provider of the default option endorses the option, that is, they recommend 
acceptance: if they did not, they would not have made it the default. This message is 
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particularly powerful when it comes from an authority whom we trust, to whom 
indeed, we are looking to supply deficiencies in our own knowledge. The second kind 
of information contained in defaults is the message that ‘This is what most people do’, 
which appeals to our willingness to go along with the crowd. When the choice 
architect is a Benthamic legislator, it simply behoves her to set utility-maximizing 
defaults. 
2.5 Saving for old age 
Bentham would agree with Thaler and Sunstein that errors in human decision-making 
occur more frequently where such decisions are infrequent, and where feedback is 
slow (i.e. where the significant consequences of those decisions only impact on our 
experience of pleasure and pain at temporally remote periods). Unfortunately, many 
of the most important decisions we make—moving house, choosing a career path, 
saving for temporally distant goals—possess these features, which limits the extent to 
which standard economics and standard rationality are applicable to them (Bruni & 
Sugden 2007, 168–9). Thaler and Sunstein use what looks like a straightforwardly 
utilitarian calculation in advocating a strong nudge to the design of contributory 
pension plans: the possible bad consequences of saving too much are simply not as 
heinous as the bad consequences of not saving enough. Bentham himself was acutely 
conscious of the way in which ‘the wants of to-day eclipse those of to-morrow’ 
(Bentham 1843, i. 313), noting that: ‘In the youth, the idea of immediate good and 
evil occupies nearly all the sphere of reflection, excluding the ideas of distant good 
and evil.’ (1843, i. 315) In discussion of the utility of Friendly Societies (voluntary 
associations paying benefits in case of sickness or old age) he noted that many young 
men would decide that they had no need to make provision for such contingencies: 
which were ‘one of them distant in itself, and seen at an exaggerated distance (for 
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such are the optics of the mind), both of them such as nature does not love to look at’ 
(Bentham 2001, 87). In relation to sickness, we are likely to underestimate the 
probability that we will be ill: ‘to a man in the vigour of youth, who knows not as yet 
what sickness is, the danger of it is but a dream: he who hopes never to be sick, is to 
punish himself with present privation, in order to insure himself against this 
unexperienced, and consequently undervalued, misfortune’. (Bentham 2001, 87) As 
regards provision for old age: 
 If he lives long enough, indeed, he is sure enough of being old:—but is he 
 destined to live long enough? Will the powers of enjoyment remaining to him 
 at that age be enough to pay him for the sacrifice he must make of the 
 instruments of enjoyment, at  an age when the power of employing them is in 
 all its vigour? Everything of that sort lies wrapt in clouds. (Bentham 2001, 
 87–8. My emphasis) 
A degree of temporal-discounting was built in to Bentham’s model of rationality. Of 
two otherwise equivalent pleasures, the first of which is to be experienced now and 
the second in the future, the rational agent will prefer the first. With regard to the 
present value of future pleasures or pains, that is pleasures and pains in prospect, that 
value is equal to the value which they would possess if they were indeed present, 
discounted according both to the degree of uncertainty that the sensation will occur, 
and to the distance in point of time which separates the individual from the experience 
of it. In regard to the temporal discount, Bentham relies on the rate of interest of 
money to supply the rate: if the interest rate is 5 per cent, a pleasure the enjoyment of 
which begins a year hence is worth 95 per cent of the same pleasure if that enjoyment 
were to begin now (Bentham 1998, 251–2). Even allowing for the temporal discount, 
however, the decisions made by young adults about whether, and how much, to set 
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aside from current income to facilitate the meeting of temporally distant needs looks 
irrational, in the Benthamic sense of failing to maximize the net balance of pleasures 
and pains. 
 What is Bentham’s response to this failure of human rationality? One option 
would be simply to respect actual choices, and insist that autonomous individuals who 
choose not to save should be respected by allowing them to reap the consequences of 
their own actions, that is, potentially, to starve or freeze to death. For Bentham, this 
strategy is unlikely to succeed for two reasons. First, the interval between action and 
consequence is simply too long. Once I have arrived at an age when the question of 
securing provision for my declining years has acquired sufficient salience, it is 
probably too late to correct my mistake (assuming that I ever did earn sufficient 
surplus income to make the necessary savings). Second, if it is too late for me, the 
potentially salutary impact of the example of my suffering on the next generation, 
who are in danger of repeating my error, is likely to be minimal: ‘How must this 
pretended lesson be weakened by the distance!—how small the analogy between an 
old and a young man!—how little does the example of the one operate upon the other! 
(Bentham 1843, i. 315) 
Despite his general belief in the good consequences of allowing individuals 
the freedom to reap as they sow, Bentham clearly believed that abandoning the 
chances of survival when the capacity to labour was exhausted to the contingent 
chance of having had both the opportunity and the foresight to set aside a sufficient 
provision, was to expect too much of human rationality. In arguing that young people 
will make systematic mistakes in this area, he anticipates Thaler and Sunstein’s plea 
for the architects of pension schemes and governments to recognize and to 
compensate for our systematic error (Thaler & Sunstein 2009, 118–19, 126–7): ‘It is 
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sought to guide those who think little; and in order to draw instruction from such a 
misfortune, it is requisite that they should think much: of what use, then, I ask, is a 
political instrument destined for the least prudent class, if it is of a nature to be 
efficacious only upon the wise?’ (Bentham 1843, i. 315) 
 Bentham’s first thought was promote the idea of saving simply by changing 
the frame of the decision. The image of senescence was both rebarbative in itself, and 
too alien from current experience to be appropriately salient, but neither negative 
applied to the prospect of marriage, which, by offering the reward of socially 
approved sexual activity, constituted an appeal to the positive rewards of the target 
state, rather than to the negative reward of avoiding temporally distant future pains. 
The combination of maximum capacity for labour with lack of responsibility for 
dependent others made young male adulthood the ideal time to foster habits of thrift, 
since at this time the necessary surplus of earnings was most likely to exist. 
Bentham’s proposed Poor Man’s Bank would provide the independent poor with the 
facility to save, and as the institution developed, the operation of the moral sanction, 
that is public opinion, would support it: ‘In process of time, under favour of the 
facility thus afforded to this species of thrift, a notion that may not unreasonably be 
expected to form itself … is that of some certain sum, as a sum that a young couple … 
ought to be in  possession of, before they engage in marriage. It may come to be 
disreputable … to set out with less’ (Bentham 2001, 80–1). The Poor Man’s Bank 
fosters the propensity to save by connecting it directly with a much desired state, and 
provides continuous prompting to the strengthening of the propensity, since every 
addition to the sacrifice of present pleasure shortens the period during which that state 
remains out of reach. Supported by an internalized moral sanction, or a desire to 
follow the herd, it punishes me for giving in to temptation to dissipate my surplus in 
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the purchase of the instantly attractive but permanently injurious gratifications of 
alcohol.20 
In another departure from the standard model, Bentham did not assume that 
adult human agents are unproblematically able to act on their preferences (Altman 
2012, 35). Recognizing again that the context of choice was a crucial variable (and 
thereby anticipating the contemporary focus of capability theorists like Sen and 
Nussbaum (Sen 1985; Nussbaum & Sen 1993), Bentham directed his reader to the 
issue of power.21 Bentham was writing at a period when the inception of state 
provision of universal benefits for old age was long in the future. In passing, he did 
flirt with the notion of making the purchase of retirement-annuities compulsory for 
those whose earnings allowed the necessary deduction to be made without threatening 
current subsistence, whilst providing a pension sufficient for subsistence at public 
charge to those who earnings were insufficient to make them ‘self-annuitable’ 
(Bentham 2001, 195–7). With reference to Thaler and Sunstein’s proposal to make 
                                            
20 The desire to provide a salient motive to thrift is also an important factor in Bentham’s defence of 
lotteries as expedients of finance. The obvious advantage of a lottery over a tax, as Bentham 
recognized (UC n.d. clxvi. 40), is its voluntary nature. However, lotteries also had an important 
collateral benefit, namely that of promoting frugality. To a modern ear, the idea of frugality-promoting 
lotteries sounds straightforwardly oxymoronic, but the contradiction is lessened, if by no means 
eliminated, when the price of entry to the lottery, that is the price of a ticket, rises to the point where a 
sustained period of self-denial is required to meet that price: ‘The sacrifice of the present to the future, 
of the pleasure of the moment to the security and satisfaction of the whole of life, is the great 
desideratum in morality … . The thoughtless are to be lured[?] to frugality by slow degrees. He who 
has prevailed upon himself to save his guinea for the purchase of a Lottery Ticket will learn in time to 
save it for the purchase of a distant Annuity for the decline of life.’ (UC n.d. clxvi. 40. My emphasis) 
The good thing about lotteries was that in order to put myself in a position to undertake an admittedly 
irrational gamble, I had to save up by resisting the daily temptations of, for instance, alcohol for an 
extended period. Such lotteries might work where advice would fall on deaf ears. Bentham admitted 
that the many losers in any lottery would suffer pain, but argued that it would very probably be 
outweighed by the value of their pleasures of hope in the extended period before the draw was made 
(Dumont n.d. 51, fo. 63). 
21 See Bentham 2001, 86 ‘The prevalence of improvidence on the part of the Poor has not unfrequently 
been made the theme of lamentation, nor certainly without cause … . But it is to little purpose to 
increase propensity where power itself is wanting: it is giving bitters instead of food. The first article to 
look to is power: that created or found existing, it is then and then only that to give existence or 
strength to inclination can be of use. This creation of power is oftentimes all that is wanting to be done 
on the part of government: for the nature of things may furnish inclination, and enough of it: but 
without power, all the inclination in the world is but uneasiness in waste. Oftentimes where inclination 
appears wanting, and perhaps really is wanting, it is only because opportunity is wanting—that power 
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‘save more tomorrow’ the default for company pension schemes (2009, 113–27), it 
seems likely that he would have approved. Given the costs of coercion, in terms of 
pain, he might also endorse the liberty-preserving back-stop of good defaults: it 
remains open to the contributor to opt-out of the default. Both in reviewing the 
possibilities that government might supply itself with revenue (and thereby reduce the 
burden of coercive taxation) by selling financial services, and in discussion of existing 
Friendly Societies, he came close to reaching two conclusions found in his 
contemporary heirs, namely (1) simply providing information, without giving 
recommendations, is very unlikely to lead to good outcomes, and (2) more choices are 
not always best (Thaler & Sunstein 2009, 120, 151–63; Bentham UC n.d. clxvi. 169, 
201) 
 
§ 3 Choice, Liberty and Formal v. Substantive Rationality 
3.1 Autonomy and the manipulation of choice  
Libertarians have objected to ‘Nudge theory’ because of its alleged undermining of 
the liberty of the individual: for the state to seek to influence choice is for the state to 
disrespect the autonomy of the free individuals who are its citizens (Hausman & 
Welch 2010; Grüne-Yanoff 2012).22 Thaler and Sunstein argue convincingly that 
since every choice presupposes a context of choice, and since empirical studies 
demonstrate the pervasive influence of seemingly trivial or irrelevant aspects of that 
context, the idea of non-intervention, of allowing unmediated choice to do its job, is 
simply fantasy. Bentham might well agree, having argued consistently that the effort 
                                                                                                                             
and consciousness of power, without which inclination can not so much as bring itself into life:—and 
such is the case here.’ (My emphasis) 
22 McQuillin and Sugden discuss a third possible source of normative value (in addition to happiness 
and freedom), namely well-being, which is assumed, in whatever it consists, to be the target of revealed 
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to erect political principles on the basis of a principle of liberty was a 
straightforwardly incoherent enterprise. Liberty—that is the absence of coercion—and 
government—that is coercion—are mutually exclusive concepts. Bentham rejected 
out of hand any political theory which began with a false premise of freedom, and 
developed instead the concept of security—precisely the product of coercive law. 
Security relates to the ability to project oneself and one’s interest into the future on 
the basis of expectations buttressed and defended by legal sanctions. No policy should 
be rejected on the basis of objections themselves grounded on the question-begging 
fallacy of its alleged incompatibility with the unproblematically autonomous choices 
of individuals, since the very notion of such choice was itself chimerical.23 The 
incoherence of liberty as a foundational value directs attention precisely to the 
conditions under which persons come to conceive of themselves and their interests 
(Quinn 1997; 2011), or, in other words, to the context or ‘architecture’ of choice. Just 
such a focus is advocated by Hargreaves Heap, who recognizes the bankruptcy of the 
notion of an ‘antecedent set of individual preferences’ (2013, 989), and notes acutely: 
‘people face a problem of how to decide what preferences to have, and this is 
something that policy can address through attention to the conditions under which 
people make such decisions without being committed to any view about what those 
preferences ought to be’ (996). 
 For Bentham, human beings simply are the type of creatures which will seek 
to control the choices of others, whenever there is the prospect of a pay-off in terms of 
pleasure or exemption from pain. We are all continually seeking to modify the 
behaviour of others in accordance with our will, while the assumption that the only 
                                                                                                                             
individual preferences (2012, 562–3). For Bentham, of course, no meaningful distinction can be drawn 
between well-being and happiness. 
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levers available to us in this task are those of force and fraud leaves the field wide 
open to those choice-architects capable—because of their possession of large 
resources, or expertize in cognitive psychology, or both—of exploiting the cognitive 
frailties of human beings. Government, as the guardian of the universal interest, owes 
its citizens not only the negative good of protection against the sinister interests of 
private choice-architects, but the positive assistance of default options and other 
nudges which help people with those frailties, that is all of us, make decisions which 
avoid consequences which we are all too lazy and or stupid to anticipate. 
3.2 What does a good choice look like? 
The challenge posed by behavioural economics to standard model of rationality, as 
utilised in the method of revealed preference, concerns the way in which revealed 
preferences often fail to maximize well-being. Failures of knowledge, of 
computational capacity and of will power issue in poor choices, which choosers later 
regret. As Thaler and Sunstein put it, the argument for seeking to nudge choosers in 
good directions is that ‘it will make choosers better off, as judged by themselves’. 
Hargreaves Heap poses the question ‘If choice is no longer a reliable guide to well-
being, what is?’ (2013, 992) McQuillin and Sugden point out that Thaler and 
Sunstein’s approach requires a criterion by which to distinguish between rational and 
irrational choices, between true and false preferences: ‘The idea that choices are 
affected by mistakes … implicitly assumes that people have reasonably coherent 
“true” preferences, even if these are not reliably revealed in choices.’ (McQuillin & 
Sugden 2012, 560) True preferences are those we would make if we had more perfect 
knowledge, indomitable will power, and first class computational abilities (Sunstein 
& Thaler 2003, 1162). In other words, they are the ones we would make if we 
                                                                                                                             
23 Most basically, new human beings whose autonomy is respected, who are, that is to say, left alone to 
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measured up to the standard model of rationality: the rational choice is the one with 
the best chance of maximizing our utility. McQuillin and Sugden admit that there are 
a range of cases in which the existence of true preferences is relatively 
uncontroversial, as in the case of the bewildering complexity of tariffs for domestic 
utilities: ‘it seems unexceptionable to assume that consumers “truly” prefer to pay less 
rather than more for given goods and services, even though they sometimes fail to 
choose the lowest price tariff’ (2012, 561). However, there are many more cases 
where the criterion for the evaluation of the rationality of consumer choices is, to say 
the least, less obvious. Thaler and Sunstein have been criticized for seeking to 
manipulate the choices of individuals in the direction of a substantive conception of 
happiness with which those individuals may in fact disagree. Hargreaves Heap 
questions the legitimacy of nudge by rejecting the notion of objective happiness: ‘who 
is to say that leading a short, fat life should be discouraged, or that consuming more 
now and less in old age is a bad thing?’ (2013, 993) In essence, a substantive 
conception of the good is being imposed under the guise of a formal conception of 
rationality. In relation to ‘nudge’ theory, the charge has significant force: Thaler & 
Sunstein are notably reluctant to commit themselves to an explicitly utilitarian scheme 
of values. In relation to Bentham, however, there is simply no case to answer. As 
noted in § 1, his notion of rationality is substantive from top to bottom: rational 
choices are those which maximize the net balance of pleasure over pain. 
Bentham, like Thaler and Sunstein, rejects the notion that people should 
simply be prohibited from making imprudent choices: since coercion is painful, the 
legislator should refrain from imposing a substantive conception of the good life on 
individuals who do not share it. Thus, what he termed ‘offences against the self’ 
                                                                                                                             
develop and pursue their own interests, do not last long enough to self-define. Without interference, no 
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should not, generally speaking, be made penal (1970, 195–6, 289–91). ‘The cases in 
which it is not better for a man to suffer by his own will, than to be saved against his 
will, are neither many, nor very easy to determine.’ (Bentham 2010a, 606) In the 
sphere of indirect legislation, however, government’s role was potentially much 
broader. If advice and information fail to motivate individuals to more prudent 
calculations, no responsible government should neglect the opportunity to influence 
behaviour in a utilitarian direction. Bentham endorsed ‘sin taxes’, for instance on 
alcohol or ostentatious funeral services (UC n.d. clxvi. 39; 141 (1952–4, i. 395)), but 
opposed the imposition of taxes on ‘merit goods’, his favourite examples being 
medicines, books and newspapers (UC n.d. clxvi. 39; xvii. 317 (1952–4, iii. 368)). 
After all, as Thaler and Sunstein might point out, those who desire short fat lives will 
still be able to act on that preference: ‘Freedom to choose is the best safeguard against 
bad choice architecture’. (Thaler & Sunstein 2009, 12) For Bentham any frugal—
meaning minimally pain-inducing—non-coercive interventions which can make it 
easier to make rational—meaning pleasure-securing or pain-avoiding—choices, can 
only be a good idea. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Bentham advanced a substantive, calculating and maximizing model of rationality. 
Although the substantive content distances his approach from that of contemporary 
economists, he shared several basic premises with them, and made early moves in the 
direction of the indirect assessment of utilities which would later be deployed in 
draining the substance from rationality, and divorcing economics from psychology. 
His own political economy was rooted in a psychology which recognized many of the 
                                                                                                                             
one would survive long enough to develop any complex interests (Bentham 2010a, 186–7n). 
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‘failures’ of rationality rediscovered by Behavioural Economists, and in the light of 
which it is plausible to regard him as one of their intellectual progenitors. The rational 
decision is that which maximizes expected happiness, and Bentham’s response to the 
cognitive biases revealed by behavioural economics would likely have been twofold. 
Insofar as both economists and legislators benefit from theories which make accurate 
predictions about human behaviour, he might well urge them to take the opportunity 
to incorporate the insights of behavioural economics into their respective theoretical 
and policy-making tool-boxes. With regard to economics, many behavioural 
economists make such a call, reflecting the perception that cleaving to an empirically 
flawed model of rationality, which appears incompatible with the empirical evidence 
about human psychology, is liable to produce significant errors in diverse parts of the 
field which economics claims as its own. (Bruni & Sugden 2007, 161–71; Camerer & 
Lowenstein 2004, 42–3; Binmore 1999). In relation to governments, there seems little 
doubt that Bentham would advise them to heed the lessons of behavioural economics 
by providing governmental nudges (except where the desired end could only be 
achieved through more coercive measures). Since Bentham’s enterprise encompassed 
not merely law and public policy, but deontology, or private ethics, there might well 
have been a second element to his response. Insofar as errors in prudential reasoning 
are widespread, he would see a role for behavioural economists as deontologists, in 
‘pointing out to each man on each occasion what course of conduct promises to be in 
the highest degree conducive to his happiness’ (Bentham 1983, 123), as has been 
envisaged by Lowenstein and Ubel in their recommendation that the target audience 
for the discipline should be individuals rather than governments (2008), and, in 
varying degrees, by Thaler and Sunstein (2009) and Kahneman (2011). Finally, he 
would have viewed concerns over manipulation of choice and assaults on autonomy 
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as founded on a fallacious presumption of individual liberty, while his explicitly 
substantive notion of rationality would render him immune from charges that a fully 
developed and contestable standard of value was being disingenuously incorporated 
into an ostensibly formal evaluation of the rationality of choice.24 
                                            
24 It is entirely arguable that the disjunction between experienced and remembered utility revealed in 
the seminal experiments by Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin (1997) presents Bentham’s theory with a 
significant difficulty which Bentham himself never addressed, in so far as utility, the objective carrier 
of value, appears to speak with not one, but a plurality of voices. To which should the utilitarian cleave: 
decision utility, experienced utility or remembered utility? The choice matters because the different 
concepts will yield different prescriptions: should medical interventions aim to minimize total 
experienced pain or total remembered pain? However, proper investigation of the issue would require a 
different paper.     
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